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A note on k-price auctions with complete information
when mixed strategies are allowed




Restricting attention to players who use pure strategies, Tauman (2001) proves that
in a k-price auction (k  3) for every Nash equilibrium in which no player uses a weakly
dominated strategy: (i) the bidder with the highest value wins the auction and (ii) pays
a price higher than the second-highest value among the players, thereby generating
more revenue for the seller than would occur in a rst- or second-price auction. We
show that these results do not necessarily hold when mixed strategies are allowed. In
particular, we construct an equilibrium for k  4 in which the second-highest valued
player wins the auction and makes an expected payment strictly less than her value.
This equilibriumwhich exists for any generic draw of player valuationsinvolves only
one player using a nondegenerate mixed strategy, for which the amount of mixing can
be made arbitrarily small.
JEL Classication Numbers: C72 (noncooperative games), D44 (auctions)
Keywords: k-price auction
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1 Introduction
Tauman (2001) considers k-price auctions, in which a seller of a single unit solicits monetary
bids from n  k players, with the player submitting the highest bid winning the auction and
paying the k-th highest bid (with ties broken randomly). Players have complete information
about each others values and are named such that their values are nonincreasing:
v1 > v2 >    > vn:
As far as we know Taumans is the only paper that considers k-price auctions in an com-
plete information setting. The incomplete information setting is studied by Monderer and
Tennenholtz (2000, 2004), Azrieli and Levin (2012), and Tumendemberel (2013). Payo¤s to
players in Taumans setting are linear: if player i wins a good with probability q and pays
m, her payo¤ is: qvi  m. Tauman restricts strategy spaces to pure strategies and restricts
attention to Nash equilibria in which players do not use weakly dominated strategies (he
shows that a pure strategy bid b0i is weakly dominated if and only if b
0
i < vi). In this set-
ting, Tauman constructs a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in which no player uses a weakly
dominated strategy and nds that for every such equilibrium, the following results hold:
R1: Player 1 (with the highest value) wins the auction with probability one.
R2: The seller obtains an expected prot  in the interval [v2; v1].
In our note, we maintain the complete information setting, but allow the players to use mixed
strategies. We construct a Nash equilibrium (in which no player uses a weakly dominated
strategy) for the k-price auction (k  4) in which neither result R1 nor R2 holds. Our
equilibrium exists for all (generic) draws of valuations such that valuations di¤er. Further,
only player k uses a nondegenerate mixed strategy: all other players use a pure strategy.
Further still, such equilibria can be constructed in which player k places an arbitrarily close
to one probability on a single bid. Thus, our note sheds light on the critical nature of the
pure-strategy assumption in Taumans note.
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Before getting underway, we remark that mixed strategies are natural to consider in auc-
tion games with complete information. For example, Hirshleifer and Riley (1992) construct
mixed strategy Nash equilibria for the rst-price auction and Hillman and Riley (1989) do the
same for the all-pay auction. In the rst-price auction, the second-highest valued player uses
a mixed strategy which never wins in equilibrium (but is critical for providing the highest-
valued players equilibrium incentives). In the all-pay auction, both the second-highest and
highest-valued bidders use mixed strategies, with the second-highest valued player winning
with positive probability. More generally, k price auctions have an all-or-nothing aspect,
where all but one player lose the auction and get a payo¤ of 0 while one player wins the
auction and can get a nonzero payo¤, making these auctions not so di¤erent from zero sum
games such as matching pennies where mixed-strategy Nash equilibria obtain. For one ex-
ample, see Walker and Wooders (2001) who give evidence that tennis players use mixed
strategies in deciding where to serve and defend.
2 Results
We construct a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for any k-price auction with k  4. We
rst parameterize bid strategies and then show that with appropriately chosen parameter
values, the strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium. Let H be a potential bid such that
H > v1. Suppose that the players use the following strategies. All players but player k use a
pure strategy: player 1 bids her value v1; player 2 bids H+" (" > 0); players 3 through k 1
each bid H; and each player i > k bids her value vi. Player k uses a mixed strategy: bidding
H with probability p and bidding v3 with probability 1  p, where 0 < p < 1. Observe that
these strategies are weakly undominated (since no player bids below her value).
We next construct the conditions needed to support the equilibrium. Using the proposed
strategies, player 2 will win the auction and will pay v1 with probability p and pay v3 with
probability 1  p; all other players will lose the auction and earn payo¤s of 0.
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If player 1 unilaterally deviates by bidding high enough to win the auction (say by bidding
H+2"), then the k-th highest price will be set by the realization of player ks mixed strategy.
Equilibrium requires that player 1s expected payo¤ from such a deviation be nonpositive:
p (v1  H) + (1  p) (v1   v3)  0: (1)
Any deviation by player 1 such that she still loses the auction leaves her payo¤ unchanged.
For the proposed strategies to form an equilibrium, player 2 must earn a nonnegative
payo¤:
p (v2   v1) + (1  p) (v2   v3)  0. (2)
If condition (2) holds, then there are no protable unilateral deviations for player 2: any bid
higher than H leaves her payo¤ unchanged; any bid lower than H gives her payo¤ 0; and
a bid of exactly H ties for highest, and she will sometimes get the payo¤ given in (2) and
sometimes 0, depending on the sellers random selection of the winner.
If any of the remaining players (i > 2) unilaterally deviates by bidding high enough to
win the auction, the resulting price will be either v1 or v3, thereby not increasing the players
payo¤.
Thus, the conjectured strategies form a Nash equilibrium so long as both conditions (1)
and (2) hold. For any prole of player values, both conditions (1) and (2) can be satised
by simultaneously making H large enough and p > 0 small enough.1
These strategies do not form an equilibrium in a third-price auction (k = 3). In this
case, there is no bidder that always bids H. By unilaterally deviating to bidding b0 2 (v1; H)
with probability one, player 2 will still win the auction when it is protable for her to do so
(when player 3 bids v3), but player 2 will lose the auction whenever winning would result in
a loss for her (when player 3 bids H). Thus, player 2s expected payo¤ from this deviation
strictly increases to (1  p) (v2   v3), invalidating the proposed strategies from forming a
Nash equilibrium.
1Conditions (1) and (2) can respectively be expressed asH  (v1   v3) =p+v3 and p  (v2   v3) =(v1 v3).
3
Summing up, we have found equilibria for the k-price auction (k  4) in which only player
k is using a nondegenerate mixed strategy and, further, her probability 1   p of bidding v3
can be made arbitrarily close to one, if in turn H is su¢ ciently high for condition (1) to
hold. Player 2 (with the second highest value) wins the auction with probability one and
the seller obtains expected revenue of pv1+(1 p)v3. This revenue is strictly less than v2 for
equilibria with p < (v2   v3) =(v1   v3). Consequently, these mixed-strategy Nash equilibria
violate both R1 and R2 that Tauman found to be true of all pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
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